爱立信够牛逼的啊，生怼市场监督管理总局

纠结的大白菜

中国国家市场监管总局（SAMR）标准必要专利领域指南草案
2023年6月30日，中国国家市场监管总局发布了《标准必要专利领域反垄断指南草案（征求意见稿）》。拟议的草案包括许多有问题的条款，包括以下条款。

首先，准则草案对标准制定者规定了一项过于繁重和不合理的义务，即申报信息的真实性和准确性，这在国际上是无与伦比的（§5）。

其次，准则草案规定了一项强制性的非自愿FRAND义务（§6）。

第三，指南草案给专利持有人带来了繁重而不切实际的负担，要求他们提供所有标准必要专利清单（§7）。

第四，准则草案忽视了一个现实，即多个技术解决方案可能被纳入一个标准（§8）。

第五，指南草案错误地将每一项标准必要专利描述为赋予100%的市场份额和市场力量，忽视了FRAND承诺的有效性（§11和§12）。

第六，指南草案没有遵循特定标准开发组织的专利政策来界定FRAND承诺的范围（§13）。

SAMR的准则草案包含其他有问题的建议。它们给专利持有人带来了巨大的负担，而没有将其建立在经验证据或健全的竞争法分析的基础上。在中国，专利强制实行需要法院介入。如果不在中国法院成功起诉中国侵权人，美国专利持有人就无法在中国获得救济，法院会调查每个案件的事实。因此，SEP不赋予任何市场力量。然而，当此类诉讼发生时，SAMR已经进行了干预，尽管SEP持有人缺乏市场力量，但现在似乎正在为此类干预寻求额外的依据。

以下是原文：

China SAMR Draft Guidelines in the Field of Standards Essential Patents

On June 30, 2023, China’s State Administration of Market Regulation (SAMR) released “Draft Antimonopoly Guidelines in the Field of Standard Essential Patents.” The proposed guidelines include numerous problematic articles, including the following.

First, the draft guidelines place an unduly onerous and unreasonable obligation on contributors to standards development re the authenticity and accuracy of the declaration information, which is unparalleled internationally (§5).

Second, the draft guidelines impose a mandatory non-voluntary FRAND obligation (§6).

Third, the draft guidelines place onerous and impractical burdens on patent holders to provide lists of all standards essential patents (§7).

Fourth, the draft guidelines ignore the reality in which multiple technical solutions may be adopted into a standard (§8).

Fifth, the draft guidelines erroneously characterize each and every standards essential patent as bestowing a 100% market share and market power, ignoring the effectiveness of FRAND commitments (§11 and §12).

Sixth, the draft guidelines fail to defer to the patent policy of the specific standards development organization as delineating the scope of FRAND commitment (§13).

SAMR’s draft guidelines contain additional problematic proposals. They create significant burdens on patent holders without grounding them in empirical evidence or in sound competition law analysis. Patent enforcement requires court intervention in China. U.S. patent holders cannot obtain relief in China without successfully litigating in a Chinese court against a Chinese infringer, and courts look into the facts of each case. Therefore, SEPs do not bestow any market power. However, when such litigation takes place, SAMR has intervened, and now seems to seek additional bases for such intervention despite lack of market power by SEP holders.

在反馈意见的结尾部分，爱立信还提到：第四，与其他司法管辖区进行多边和双边对话，促进就调查和政策制定中的正当程序原则达成协议。一些非美国司法管辖区打着“竞争法”的幌子，在没有正当程序的情况下帮助其国家冠军，或在没有正当流程的情况下制定政策。程序性保障措施有助于减少其中一些动态。

Fourth, engage in multilateral and bilateral dialogues with other jurisdictions to promote agreements on principles of due process in investigations and policy development. Some non-U.S. jurisdictions use the guise of “competition law” to help their national champions without due process, or develop policies without due process. Procedural safeguards can help reduce some of these dynamics.